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CHAPTER 1-INTRODUCTION 
  The current transfer pricing problems in the United States have materialized into 
statistics that are difficult to wrap our heads around. Pfizer Inc. between the years of 2007 and 
2009 reported a net loss of $5.2 billion in the United States, the country where its corporate 
headquarters is located. In those same years, its foreign subsidiary located in Ireland, reported a 
pretax profit of $20.4 billion.1 Oracle Corporation’s Irish subsidiary paid no income taxes in 
2006 and 2007 while it managed to produce one fourth of Oracles’ total pretax income. The 
subsidiary located in Ireland accomplished all of this without one recorded employee.2 
Thousands of other multinational corporations are taking advantage of the transfer pricing 
regulations and creating enforcement and financial problems for our government.  
The frequency of transfer pricing tax evasion by corporations now challenges the 
enforcement of United States and International Tax Laws. Recent reports and news articles have 
covered how multinational corporations are abusing loopholes in the current international tax 
system. Companies like Pfizer Inc., Oracle Corp, Google Inc, and thousands of other American 
based companies are engaging in legal transfer pricing activities by shifting assets to foreign-
base subsidiaries to avoid paying United States taxes. This has raised financial red flags for the 
United States Government, as an estimated $60 billion are being evaded each year.3 With high 
profiting large multinational corporations ducking out of paying these taxes, more burden is 
                                                          
1 Drucker, Jessie, “Tax `Shenanigans' Turn U.S. Sales to Foreign Income With Billions Offshore,” Bloomberg, July 22, 
2010 Accessed October 24,2010 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-23/tax-shenanigans-turn-u-s-sales-to-
foreign-income-with-billions-offshore.html. 
2
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3
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being shifted to the small companies and the citizens of this country to pay for national security, 
school systems and public services.4  
The IRS has taken steps to realign certain internal divisions in order to create a more 
centralized organization dedicated to improving and monitoring international tax compliance. 
The realignment announced on August 4, 2010 has been implemented as of October 1, 2010 and 
will focus on offshore tax evasion.5 This is to be accomplished by “coordinating the competent 
authority more closely with field staff that originate[s] cases, especially those dealing with 
transfer pricing and enhancing the IRS’s focus on transfer pricing.”6 This restructuration of focus 
also included revising tax treaties and tax information exchange agreements to increase the 
difficulty of internationally evading taxes.7 
 
CHAPTER 2- THE CURRENT SITUATION 
Transfer pricing is defined as the price charged between related parties for goods, 
services, or use of property.8 Transfer pricing is globally used by a large amount of companies 
and related enterprises to replicate cost allocations. It is a significant part for both the tax payers 
                                                          
4
 Levin, Sander M., “Hearing on Transfer Pricing Issues,” Hearing before the Committee on Ways and Means. U.S. 
House of Representatives, One hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, July 22, 2010. 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Hearings/transcript.aspx?NewsID=11273  
5
 “IRS Realigns and Renames Large Business Division, Enhances Focus on International Tax Administration,” IRS 
Newswire, August 4, 2010. http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=226284,00.html 
6
 IRS Newswire 
7
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8
 “Transfer Pricing” BusinessDictionary.com, November 18, 2010 http://www.businessdictionary.com/ 
definition/transfer-price.html 
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and tax administrators because cost allocations have a large impact on income, which ultimately 
determines a corporation’s taxable income.9   
One of the current issues the IRS is dealing with, involves legally shifting profits out of 
the U.S. to tax havens like Bermuda, Switzerland, Ireland, Singapore, and the Cayman Islands.10 
These nations have lower corporate tax rates compared to the United States’ 35 percent. Some 
even have special tax exemptions for operating businesses in their country which pose large 
financial benefits for U.S. based companies. By taking advantage of these foreign tax rates and 
exemptions, multinational corporations are lowering their international tax rates and reporting 
higher profits.11  
 The general process that these worldwide companies employ is similar to the following 
example: 
 A corporation is comprised of a United States parent company, a foreign principal and 
other foreign subsidiaries. The foreign subsidiaries’ purpose is to distribute and/or manufacture 
products while the foreign principal holds the responsibility of making executive and investment 
business decisions.12 In addition, the foreign principal holds the intangible property which is the 
trademark, patent or property the business profits on. The U.S. parent company supplies 
marketing knowledge, supporting services and sometimes engages in domestic and foreign 
distribution. The foreign subsidiaries and the U.S parent company run limited risk operations 
                                                          
9
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which are considered low profit in transfer pricing analysis, while the high profit activities occur 
at the foreign principal because it holds the intangible property. 13 Therefore, the corporation will 
allocate or transfer a majority of their income to the foreign principal located in a country with a 
tax exemption or low tax rates. Overall, this process leads to lower overall taxes and increased 
returns for the corporation’s investors.14 
The controversy of this method is that the intangible property the foreign principal owns 
was developed in the United States but taxed in another country. Intangible property, as the name 
suggests, lacks any physical form and therefore the only incentive for ownership in one country 
as opposed to another is tax avoidance.15  Frequently, the intangible property is developed using 
American technology and research, both of which are subsidized by United States tax incentives. 
Just before the product, containing the intangible property, is produced or released, it is 
transferred to a foreign principal located in a tax haven. While corporations boast higher profits 
and lower taxes, the U.S. Treasury is left with little return on their investments.16            
Intangible property can be shifted to foreign principals with a cost sharing or licensing 
agreement. In a cost sharing agreement, a United States parent and a foreign principal will agree 
upon how costs for developing intangible property are to be allocated between them. With this 
agreement, if a patent was produced by the parent, the foreign principal has the rights to use that 
patent for a portion of developmental costs.17 There are tax incentives because if the parent is 
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located in a higher tax jurisdiction than the principal and the developmental costs are less than 
market-based royalty fees, the corporation can decrease its global tax liability.18  
When the IRS approved and adopted the cost sharing method for transfer pricing, it was 
done for two reasons. The first was to avoid the need to value a firm’s intangible property. The 
costs in creating the intangible property would already be shared by the two parties, thus both are 
part owners. 19 Yet parent companies under cost sharing agreements are still selling and 
transferring intangible property to their subsidiaries. The second reason for implementing cost 
sharing was to distribute equally the high-risk of research and development.  Research and 
development and other intangible property advancements are considered high-risk and the 
agreement allows the risk to be spread among parent companies and their subsidiaries. 
Nonetheless, corporations are shifting cost and risks under transactions that appear to violate the 
arm’s length standard. 20   
               A licensing agreement between a U.S. parent and its foreign principal contains terms 
for preexisting intangible property rights and royalty payments in return. These royalty payments 
are taxable income in the United States.21 The current issue surrounding the sale and transfer of 
intangible property is how to accurately value the transaction. Without an accurate value, an 
appropriate arm’s length payment or royalty fees are difficult to support.22  
                                                          
18
 Dye, Ronald A., “Cost-Sharing Agreement A tax-saving device of multi-nationals,”"Valuation Issues for Buy-In 
Payments Associated with Cost-Sharing Agreements" Kellogg School of Management, 2008. 
http://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/index.php/Kellogg/article/cost_sharing_agreements 
19
 Morgan, William R. “Hearing on Transfer Pricing Issues” July 22, 2010. 
20
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           The use of the arm’s length standard in U.S. transfer pricing regulations is another 
major problem and may be the root of all transfer pricing issues. All transfer pricing disputes 
arise over the arm’s length standard principal. In court, corporations will support related party 
transfer prices and allocations with unrelated transactions, believed to be within arm’s length. 
The IRS will argue that the unrelated transaction is not arm’s length because of a difference in 
quantity, market price, type of customer, packaging and other non-monetary factors. But because 
certain transactions are unique and no comparable unrelated transaction exists, a level of 
ambiguity surrounds the arm’s length standard. Especially with transactions concerning 
intangible property, no comparables exist because of their nature.23  
If the arm’s length standard is ruled violated by the Tax Court, Section 482 of the IRS 
Tax Code- Allocation of Income and Deductions among Taxpayers, “authorizes the IRS to adjust 
the income, deductions, credits, or allowances of commonly controlled taxpayers to prevent 
evasion of taxes or to clearly reflect their income.”24 Its main purpose is to deter and prevent 
related taxpayers from shifting income between each other by placing related taxpayers and the 
same level as unrelated taxpayers.   
 
CHAPTER 3- SHIFTING INTANGIBLE PROPERTY 
   Google has legally evaded $3.1 billion dollars worth of taxes in the past three years 
through a process Google and many other global corporations have utilized called “Double Irish” 
                                                          
23
 Avi-Yonah,Reuven, “Hearing on Transfer Pricing Issues” July 22, 2010.  
24
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or “Dutch Sandwich.”25 These companies have shifted income through multiple foreign 
subsidiaries and tax havens in order to take advantage of lower tax rates. Google has dropped its 
foreign tax rate to a shocking 2.4 percent; while within the United States, they are paying the 35 
percent corporate tax rate.26 Google moves its profits through Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Bermuda, every stop taking advantage of each country’s corporate tax laws.  
            Google’s subsidiary, Google Ireland Limited, located in Dublin, sells advertising and 
transfers its profits by paying royalty fees to Google Ireland Holdings. Google Ireland Holdings 
is the foreign principle based in the Bermudas and owns the intangible property.27 The royalty 
fees paid by Google Ireland Limited reduce the corporation’s pre-taxable income in Ireland. In 
addition, these royalty fees are free from Irish taxes because they are paid to a tax haven country, 
the Bermudas.28  However, to avoid Ireland’s withholding tax, the money is transferred to the 
Google Netherlands Holdings B.V office, which has no employees on record, before it reaches 
the Bermudas. Once in the Bermudas, the income is untraceable by the IRS because Google 
Ireland Holdings is an unlimited liability company. Under Irish laws, unlimited liability 
companies are not required to release certain financial information. This foreign income could be 
taxed if it funnels back into the United States, but very little of it actually does.29 This process is 
so effective, it was estimated that if Google were to pay all of its income at the United States 35 
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percent corporate tax rate, the stock price would drop somewhere around one hundred dollars 
down to the $50030 range.31   
                Under the U.S. tax laws Google must pay arm’s length prices for the rights to the 
intangible property that was transferred to the Google Ireland Holdings unit. However, the 
transaction and pricing agreements were approved by the IRS in 2006. According to the Google 
press release on its fourth quarter 2006 financial results, the following was stated concerning the 
Advanced Pricing Agreement:  
                “In December 2006, Google entered into an Advanced Pricing Agreement ("APA") 
with the IRS in connection with certain intercompany transfer pricing arrangements. The APA 
applies to the taxation years beginning in 2003. As a result of the APA, we reduced certain of our 
income tax contingency reserves and recognized an income tax benefit of $90 million in the 
fourth quarter… In addition, in the fourth quarter, the 2006 R&D tax credit was enacted, which 
resulted in a $78 million benefit to our provision for income taxes.”32 
                Also through this APA, Google has transferred its intangible property rights to Google 
Ireland Holdings at a price that was not disclosed.33  Google has received tax benefits and 
lowered international tax liabilities with the APA. “An APA is a binding contract between the 
IRS and a taxpayer by which the IRS agrees not to seek a transfer pricing adjustment for a 
covered transaction if the taxpayer files its tax return for a covered year consistent with the 
                                                          
30
  Google Finance, G00G -$591 a share (As of November 22,2010)    
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agreed transfer pricing method.”34 Its purpose is to eliminate potential transfer pricing disputes in 
a cooperative manner, but Google has legally abused the APA for large financial benefits.  
The IRS has not charged Google with any wrong doing at this time and many other 
multinational corporations are engaging in similar activities. The frequent abuse of transfer 
pricing laws has prompted the IRS to reorganize internal divisions to better enforce international 
tax compliance.   
               In previous years, the IRS has brought many corporations to court over transfer pricing 
and intangible property issues and those found guilty of violating regulations have been 
penalized accordingly. However, cases have been settled outside of tax court for negotiated 
fines.  
 In 2006 GlaxoSmithKline plc, one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies 
settled a $3.4 billion fine with the IRS for transfer pricing disputes from 1989-2005.35 The 
essence of the dispute was over the allocation and transfer prices of Zantac’s profits, an ulcer 
treatment that was produced by Glaxo before the merger into GlaxoSmithKline. If this case 
would have gone to court, it was reported that GlaxoSmithKline could have faced a potential 
liability of $ 11.5 billion dollars. The settlement on September 12, 2006 was the largest tax 
dispute settlement in the IRS’ history.36  
                                                          
34
 “Advanced Pricing Agreement Program,” IRS Business, Last Updated September 9, 2010, 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=96277,00.html 
35
 Shaw, Helen. “GlaxoSmithKline Settles Largest IRS Tax Dispute,” CFO.com, 2003, Oct 20, 2010, 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7903093/c_7901942?f=TodayInFinance_Inside 
36
 Mortished, Carl, “GSK settles largest tax dispute in history for $3.1bn,” The Sunday Times, September 12, 2006 
Accessed October 27, 2010. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/health/article635994.ece 
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CHAPTER 4- VAULUING INTANGIBLE PROPERTY 
VERITAS SOFTWARE CORPORATION & SUBSIDIARIES 
v.  
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
UNITED STATES TAX COURT 
December 10, 2009, Filed 
               In the recent case, Veritas Software Corporation & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, the dispute is around intangible property valuation and the arm’s length 
standard . Veritas, a company based in Delaware but operating out of Cupertino, California, 
develops, manufactures, markets, and sells advanced storage management software products.37  
The question posed to the Tax Court is whether Veritas Ireland, the subsidiary of Veritas, 
paid an acceptable arm’s length payment to Veritas for intangible property. Back in 1999 Veritas 
Ireland and Veritas U.S. entered into a cost-sharing agreement for all research and development 
costs. Both parties agreed to “to pool their respective resources and R&D efforts related to 
software products and software manufacturing processes. They also agreed to share the costs and 
risks of such R&D on a going-forward basis.”38 This agreement led to the buy-in payment in 
2000 of $166 million that Veritas Ireland paid to Veritas U.S. for the preexisting intangible 
property. However, in 2002 the amount was adjusted to $118 million.  The IRS inspected the tax 
returns of Veritas U.S. for 2000 and 2001, determined the buy- in valuation was not in 
                                                          
37
“Veritas Software Corp. v. Comm'r,” United States Tax Court. 2009 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 34; 133 T.C. No. 14; 
December 10, 2009, Filed. No. 12075-06. 
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compliance with arm’s length standard and issued a notice of deficiency. This initial notice was 
based on a $2.5 billion valuation, but during trial the IRS lowered its analysis by $825 million.39  
            The IRS expert John Hatch used a discounted cashflow analysis which determined that 
the appropriate buy-in payment would be $1.675 billion, while the initial buy-in payment 
recorded by Veritas U.S. was 14 times lower.40 Hatch used a different method of valuation and 
recent comparable transactions while Veritas U.S. used the comparable uncontrolled transaction 
method (CUT).   
            The United States Tax Court determined Hatch’s valuation for the buy-in payment was 
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable for several reasons.41 Hatch’s allocation took into 
account, certain items and products that were of no value. For example he included in the 
valuation Veritas U.S.’s customer list, customer base and distribution channels.42 Hatch also used 
the wrong useful life, discount rate and growth rates. Hatch predicted that between 2001 and 
2005, Veritas Ireland's compound annual growth rate was 17.91 percent and that their revenues 
would increase by 13 percent each year from 2007-2010. However, Veritas Ireland’s actual 
growth rate was only 3.75 percent in 2004-2006.43 His approach was further denied when Hatch 
                                                          
39
 “Veritas Software Corp. v. Comm'r”. 
40
 Chung, Kerwin, Hustad, Cindy and Shapiro, Alan, “Tax Court rejects IRS’s cost sharing buy-in valuation analysis,” 
Deloitte, Global Transfer Pricing: Arm’s Length Standard, December/January, 2009/2010, Accessed October 2, 
2010. http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom- Global/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/Newsletters/ 
dtt_tax_armslengthstandard_091214.pdf  
41
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42
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- 12 - 
 
himself stated at the trial that “he did not have an opinion as to whether his methodology 
captured the synergistic value of the transferred intangible.”44  
           The Tax Court ruled the buy-in payment was best valued using Veritas’s comparable 
uncontrolled transaction method with a few adjustments and rejected the IRS’s allocation. 45 
 
CHAPTER 5- COST SHARING AGREEMENTS 
XILINX INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES 
v. 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 
UNITED STATES TAX COURT 
August 30, 2005, Filed 
            In the case between Xilinx, Inc and Consolidated Subsidiaries V. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, the IRS questions the allocation of certain research and development costs in a 
cost sharing agreement.  
            In 1995, Xilinx, Inc and Xilinx Ireland entered into a Cost and Risk Sharing Agreement, 
which provided that all rights, title and interests in new technology developed by either Xilinx or 
Xilinx Ireland would be jointly owned. Under this agreement, costs directly related to research 
and development, indirect costs, and any other costs related to the development of intangible 
property, were to be shared.  In 1997, 1998, and 1999, Xilinx wrote off roughly $41 million, $40 
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million and $96 million, respectively.46 These deductions were recorded as business expenses 
based on employees' exercises of nonstatutory stock options, disqualifying dispositions of 
incentive stock options and employee stock purchase plans. In addition Xilinx claimed a research 
and development credit of $34 million, $23 million and $27 million for the same reasons.47 
The IRS issued a notice of deficiency for Xilinx’s tax years of 1997, 1998, 1999. The 
notice challenged that the employee stock compensations issued to the employees working in 
research and development, should be shared between Xilinx and its subsidiary.48 If shared, 
Xilinx Inc’s deductions would decrease and taxable income would increase.  
 The tax court issued the opinion that with respect to employee stock options, two 
unrelated parties would not share the costs at arm’s length. Under the Code of Federal 
Regulations- title 26 Internal Revenue, cost sharing agreements between two related parties are 
to reflect how two unrelated parties share costs with respect to arm’s length pricing. The court 
concluded that the IRS claims were arbitrary and capricious.49 
 The IRS appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals and questioned whether all costs are to be 
shared between related parties or if all transactions between the related parties are to mirror 
unrelated parties at arm’s length. The IRS concurs that employee stock options are costs not 
                                                          
46
 “Xilinx Inc. v. Comm'r,” United States Tax Court. 125 T.C. 37; 2005 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 24; 125 T.C. No. 4; August 
30, 2005, Filed; As Amended, September 29, 2005. As Amended, September 15, 2005. Reversed by, Remanded by 
Xilinx, Inc. v. Comm'r, 567 F.3d 482, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 11118 (9th Cir., 2009) Affirmed by Xilinx, Inc. v. Comm'r, 
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5795 (9th Cir., Mar. 22, 2010) Nos. 4142-01, 702-03. 
47
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shared between unrelated parties but argues that under 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-7(d)(1)- Sharing of 
Costs, employee stock options are costs shared between related parties.50  
 A cost sharing agreement requires related parties to share only the costs that unrelated 
parties would share. However, under § 1.482-7(d)(1), the regulations state that related parties in a 
cost sharing agreement must share all costs relating to the development of intangible property.51  
 The court determined that the employee stock options exercised in this case, are costs 
related to intangible property development and must be shared between the two parties. The 
court’s opinion was that § 1.4821(b), which states the arm’s length standard should apply “in 
every case,” was incompatible with § 1.482-7(d)(1), which states  “all costs” are to be shared in a 
cost sharing agreement.52 Therefore, under such circumstances, § 1.482-7(d)(1), the more 
specific should triumph. The ruling of the tax court was reversed.53  
 But in January of 2010 the U.S. Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit, withdrew the 
previous decision and issued a new opinion on March 22. The Court’s new opinion holds that the 
stock-based compensation does not need to be included in the research and development costs in 
a cost sharing agreement between two related parties.54  
                                                          
50
 Klitgaard, Mark, Morrison, Phillip and Shapiro, Alan, “Ninth Circuit affirms Tax Court in Xilinx,” Deloitte, Global 




 “Xilinx, Inc. v. Comm'r,” United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 567 F.3d 482; 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 
11118; 2009-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50,405; 103 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2388; March 12, 2008, Argued and Submitted, San 
Francisco, California; May 27, 2009, Filed; Opinion withdrawn by Xilinx, Inc. v. Comm'r, 592 F.3d 1017, 2010 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 778 (9th Cir. Cal., 2010). No. 06-74246, No. 06-74269 
52
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 Judge Fisher wrote in his opinion that the regulations are “hopelessly ambiguous”55 and 
concluded that “the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of what appears to be the commonly 
held understanding of the meaning and purpose of the arm’s length standard prior to this 
litigation.”56 Fisher seemed to have been influenced by the IRS’s troubles to validate their 
reasoning. He states that “the Commissioner’s [IRS’s] attempts to square the “all costs” 
regulations with the arm’s length standard have only succeeded in demonstrating that the 
regulation are at best ambiguous.”57 The current regulations make it difficult for courts to issue 
an opinion. In addition, the regulations may not be universally understood by both taxpayers and 
the IRS. The current regulations are not clear to taxpayers on how transfer pricing decisions 
affect their firms. 58  Finally Judge Fisher affirms by stating, “Xilinx’s understanding of the 
regulations is more reasonable even if the Commissioner’s [IRS’s] current interpretation may be 
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 Fisher, C Raymond, “Xilinx, Inc. v. Comm'r,”United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 598 F.3d 1191; 
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CHAPTER 6- THE ARM’S LENGTH STANDARD 
NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION AND 
CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES 
v. 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
UNITED STATES TAX COURT 
May 2, 1994, Filed 
In National Semiconductor Corporation and Consolidated Subsidiaries V. Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue, the issues surround arm’s length pricing and comparable transactions.  
 National Semiconductor Corporation’s (NSC) headquarters is located in Santa Clara, 
California and manufactures semiconductors as well as specializes in analog equipment and 
subsystems. The deficiency of reallocated income filed by the IRS for the taxable years of 1978-
1981, totaled $83.1 million. These deficiencies were all concerning NSC’s six subsidiaries 
located in Southeast Asia.60 These subsidiaries purchased semiconductor material from NSC, 
packaged them and sold a majority of their finished products back to NSC. Under the transfer 
pricing system used by NSC, their United States wafer manufacturing business sustained 
                                                          
60
 “National Semiconductor Corp. v. Commissioner,” United States Tax Court. T.C. Memo 1994-195; 1994 Tax Ct. 
Memo LEXIS 199; 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2849; May 2, 1994, Filed; As Corrected May 2, 1994. Docket Nos. 4754-89, 8031-
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operating losses from the sale of semiconductor dies and material to its Asian Subsidiaries, while 
the subsidiaries recorded a profit during 1978-1981.61   
 The issue presented to the United States Tax Court was whether the transactions between 
NSC and their six Asian Subsidiaries were in compliance with arm’s length standard under 
section 482.62 NSC claims that under the comparable uncontrolled transactions method, they 
have proven the unrelated transaction used for comparison satisfies the arm’s length standard. 
The IRS argues otherwise, stating that the deficiencies should be upheld or that NSC must adopt 
the proposal by the IRS expert.63      
 NSC asserted that the comparable transactions used were transactions involving “high-
volume, continuing relationships between leading U.S fabricators and Asian contract 
packagers.”64 But the IRS claims that these transactions differed in “volume, market level, and 
type of customer” and “the proposed prices included charges unrelated to assembly or testing.”65  
The IRS indicated one of the comparable transactions, Motorola and Anam/Amkor, contained 
packaging terms that were materially different and could not be monetarily quantified.  
 The Tax Court ruled that neither side had adequate evidence and proven their argument. 
The court considered other valuation analysis methods from both the NSC and the IRS experts 
but agreed with none of them. 
 The court decided that based on the relationship between NSC and its Asian Subsidiaries, 
it is unrealistic that the transfer prices used would result in operating losses for the parent 
                                                          
61
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62
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company while the subsidiaries incur high profits. The court made appropriate adjustments to 
bring the pricing closer to reasonable arm’s length standards. The court adjusted Horst’s (IRS 
expert) analysis to produce a fair adjustment and increased NSC’s taxable income by $ 6.96 
million, $2.54 million, $8.05 million, $13.54 million, and $9.51 million for the years 1978, 1979, 
1980, 1981, and 1982.66  
      DHL CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES 
v. 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
UNITED STATES TAX COURT 
December 30, 1998, Filed 
 The topic of discussion in DHL Corporation and Subsidiaries V. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, concerns the allocation of a trademark sale and the arm’s length standard. 
 DHL formed in 1969, in California is a package delivery company. In 1979 Document 
Handling Limited, International (DHLI) was created in Hong Kong and Middleston, N.V(MNV), 
Incorporated  ran the overseas operations.67 Up until 1987 DHL and DHLI/MNV financially 
were separate and did not exchange any fees. DHL ran the United States business and 
DHLI/MNV ran the international business.  In 1990 the two companies entered into an 
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agreement that included reciprocal performance standards by way of compensation for any 
shipment differences.68  
 In the late part of 1989, Lufthansa, Japan Airlines Co, and Nissho Iwai Corp (The Group) 
all had interest in purchasing DHLI/MNV.  On July 9, 1990 DHL granted DHLI to purchase the 
“DHL” trademark for $20 million dollars.69 This value of the intangible property was valued and 
supported by Bain & Co. However, in previous offers, the value of the trademark had been $50 
million and $100 million.70   
The deal for The Group to purchase DHLI/MNV was finalized and the firm was 
reorganized into DHL International Ltd. On September 17, 1992, DHL International Ltd 
exercised its option to purchase the “DHL” trademark for $20 million.71  
  The IRS issued a deficiency notice for the tax years 1990-1992. The Tax Court upheld 
deficiencies and penalties of $59.4 million for trademark valuation. DHL bared the burden of 
proving arm’s length pricing but failed to do so. Therefore, the court supported the income 
allocation to DHL based on the IRS’ $100 million trademark valuation. This valuation was based 
upon $50 million for domestic trademark rights and $50 million was for overseas trademark 
rights.72 DHL appealed.  
                                                          
68
 “Dhl Corp. v. Comm'r,” United States Tax Court. 
69
 “DHL Corp. v. Comm'r,” United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 285 F.3d 1210; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 
6687; 2002-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50,354; 89 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1978; 2002 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3097; 2002 Daily 
Journal DAR 3787; April 9, 2001, Argued and Submitted, San Francisco, California; April 11, 2002, Filed. No. 99-
71580, No. 00-70008, No. 99-71592, No. 99-71695 
70
 “DHL Corp. v. Comm'r,” United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
71
 “DHL Corp. v. Comm'r,” United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
72
 “Dhl Corp. v. Comm'r,” United States Tax Court. 
- 20 - 
 
 DHL argued to the U.S. Court of Appeals on April 11, 2002, that the presence of The 
Group prevented income shifts between DHL and DHLI. This case dealt with a transaction 
between two related parties and one unrelated party as opposed to just related parties.73 However, 
the court does not find the existence of The Group to alter DHL’s compliance with the arm’s 
length standard. Thus the court has reason to believe that the trademark value in the deal had 
significant related party influence.  The court confirms the non-arm’s length pricing and upholds 
the $100 million price for the transaction.74  
 DHL contested that the tax court’s valuation of the trademark was erroneous. The 
Appeals Court issued the opinion that “although the tax court painted with a broad brush, that is 
to be expected given the imprecise art of valuing an intangible asset.”75 DHL could not dispute 
exact numbers in the valuation and thus had no case. 
COMPAQ COMPUTER CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES 
v. 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
UNITED STATES TAX COURT 
July 2, 1999, Filed 
The dispute between Compaq Computers and Subsidiaries V. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue is whether the income from printed circuit assemblies or PCA’s from Compaq’s 
Singapore subsidiary was allocated at arm’s length.  
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Compaq Computers is a Delaware based company with its corporate headquarters located 
in Houston, who manufactures personal computers (PCs). A part of the central processing unit 
within the PC is the PCA. Compaq had three sources of PCAs which it used in its PCs: PCAs 
manufactured by Compaq USA, PCAs purchased from its subsidiary in Singapore, and PCAs 
purchased from unrelated subcontractors located in the United States. 76  Between the years of 
1991 and 1992 half of Compaq’s PCA demands were filled by the subsidiary.77  
The IRS filed a notice of deficiency for taxes payable of $42.4 million for 1991 and $33.5 
million for 1992 questioning the transfer pricing used.78  
Both Compaq U.S. and Compaq Singapore used a standard cost system to track their 
manufacturing cost of these PCA’s. This included assigning specific costs material, labor, and 
overhead standards. Costs concerning the material and labor costs were based on forecasted 
production at each of the respected manufacturing locations.  In general, the costs to manufacture 
PCA’s were cheaper in Singapore than in Houston.79  
The prices for PCA’s were determined by Compaq U.S. using turnkey pricing. Turnkey is 
a variation of cost-plus pricing, where a firm accounts for fixed costs by adding the amount paid 
to the manufacturer to the markup of the good or service. In relation to Compaq’s case, unrelated 
contractors would purchase materials needed to manufacture PCA’s from Compaq U.S.’s vendor 
lists. When Compaq purchased the fully completed PCA’s from the unrelated contractors, the 
turnkey price paid, compensated the subcontracts for materials, labor, overhead and the profit 
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markup.80 Because of the competition between unrelated subcontractors, prices were set at 
market levels in the United States.  Compaq U.S. used these market prices to set benchmark 
prices for the PCA’s purchased from Compaq Singapore.  However, the prices used for its 
subsidiary did not include compensation for overtime, changes in material price, setup charges 
and many other factors determining price.81  
These transfer prices used in 1991 and 1992 were set using a cost-plus formula. In total 
during 1991 and 1992, Compaq Singapore’s transactions with Compaq U.S. were 101.5 percent 
and 88.1 percent of Compaq U.S. standard PCA production cost. Compaq Singapore sold PCAs 
to Compaq U.S. with an average transfer price of 93.9 percent or 6.1 percent less than standard 
production costs.82  
The IRS investigation discovered that the purchases from Singapore and other unrelated 
subsidiaries were almost identical except for some differences in the transactions.  The 
comparable transactions used by Compaq U.S. did not satisfy as arm’s length comparables for 
the purchases of PCA’s from Compaq Singapore.  Compaq U.S. marked up Compaq Singapore’s 
manufacturing profit by 7.5 percent which produced an aggregate sum of $232 million more for 
Singapore’s PCA’s in 1991 and 1992.83 It was determined that the transfer price used was not at 
arm’s length and the IRS increased Compaq U.S’s taxable income in 1991 by $124.4 million and 
$90.4 million in 1992.84  
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In defense, Compaq U.S. compared its pricing decisions with its standard costs on the 
turnkey basis.  Under the turnkey transactions with unrelated subcontractors, Compaq U.S. 
bought 3.6 million PCA’s worth $597 million dollars in 1991 and 1992.85  
Comparable unrelated sales are present because of the purchases with the unrelated 
subcontractors and therefore, the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method must be used. 
Because the PCA’s purchased from its subsidiary were different, certain price adjustments had to 
be made to determine an arm’s length price. The IRS determined that Compaq U.S. paid less 
than arm’s length prices to its subsidiaries using the CUP method. 
Compaq U.S. argues that the transactions with unrelated subcontractors are consignment 
purchases and cannot be used as comparables. As a result, the transactions cannot accurately be 
converted to comparable prices and thus CUP comparison cannot be used. Compaq Singapore’s 
prices should instead be compared with similar industry net profit margins of 17.7 percent.86 
Compaq Singapore’s costs were less than other comparable companies; as a result, the transfer 
prices should be less than prices paid to unrelated subcontractors. The prices paid to Compaq 
Singapore are consistent with the arm’s length standard because it would yield a similar net 
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CHAPTER 7- SOLUTIONS TO SHIFTING INTANGIBLE PROPERTY 
 The abuse and exploitation of transfer pricing laws Google, Oracle, and other 
multinational corporations are engaging in is currently legal.  Every quarter and every year these 
techniques are employed, the country loses a large portion of taxable income abroad. This 
problem stretches beyond the borders of the United States because corporations are financially 
motivated by tax incentives and tax havens provided by foreign countries. Since foreign tax rates 
and regulations are the foundation of the issue, it is difficult to solve.   
A recent bill, H.R. 5328: the International Competitiveness Act, was introduced to the 
House on May 18, 2010 and sponsored by Rep. Lloyd Doggett [D-TX25].87 The bill’s purpose is 
to reduce the incentive to transfer intellectual property overseas and to reduce international tax 
avoidance. The bill aims to tax a portion of the income from the intangible property associated 
with American technology and labor, which has been shifted internationally.  The bill itself 
makes several amendments to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. As of November 19, 2010, no 
further action has been taken.88 
This bill is certainly a step in the right direction to deter corporations from utilizing 
abusive transfer pricing schemes, but the root of the problem is the high U.S. corporation tax 
rate.  Currently at 35 percent, the United States holds the second highest corporate tax rate 
among members of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). 
Only Japan taxes at a higher rate, but has plans on lowering it which would leave America at the 
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top of the list. Currently, the average corporate tax rate of OECD members is 23 percent and 
falling.89  The high corporate tax rate is the underlying reason why U.S based corporations are 
opting to transfer intellectual property out to countries with lower tax rates. A lower United 
States corporate tax rate may alleviate transfer pricing problems, encourage foreign investment, 
as well as ignite job creation in the tough economy. But it is unrealistic that the government will 
significantly decrease in tax rates so that corporations will have no incentives to ship intellectual 
property overseas. It is highly unlikely in the near future that U.S. tax rates will be competitive 
with foreign tax havens.  
The amount of taxable income leaking out of the borders and abusing international tax 
regulations has drawn apprehension from the government and IRS.  The current concerns are 
pointing to a solution that would retain all of the taxable income from the American developed 
intangible property in this country. From a corporation’s point of view, this doesn’t appear as a 
practical solution to put a lock on everything that is researched and developed in this country. 
Our government should be getting returns on research and development grants but the solution 
cannot be on the exact opposite side of the spectrum. Adequate leniencies must still be available 
where corporations are still permitted to transfer intangible property overseas and not be taxed 
heavily. If not, it will hurt the corporations who are not tax minimizing driven, but business 
motivated.90  
One solution would be to take the side of a pharmaceutical company, with respect to the 
current medical drug patent law, and allow the United States to tax and profit for a limited 
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number of years. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, drug patents can only be 
active for 12 years, after that, generic drugs are allowed to be manufactured.91 In transfer pricing 
terms, it should be that all intangible property that is solely or jointly researched and developed 
in the United States is subject to taxation for a certain amount of years after the intangible 
property begins to earn profits. In addition, the intangible property must remain in the United 
States for its taxable years and only after the time period has expired is the corporation free to 
transfer the intangible property to a lower tax jurisdiction. This way the United States will be 
able to tax the intangible property at its most profitable stage and see immediate returns. This 
time restriction should not be as long as 12 years, because it would considerably alter U.S. based 
companies’ business plans. The government is not after a solution that will significantly deter 
Google, Oracle or Pfizer from developing intangible property in this country, but one that would 
put some more money in the government’s pockets.  
 
CHAPTER 8- SOLUTIONS TO VAULUING INTANGIBLE PROPERTY 
As seen in the Veritas Software Corporation and DHL Corporation cases, discrepancies 
are inevitable in the valuation of intangible property when sold between related parties. It is clear 
that the motivation to price intangible property at a lower value is to increase profits for the 
buyer and decrease taxable income for the seller. With the current transfer pricing regulations, 
especially related party sales and arm’s length standards, the IRS has no choice but to value a 
corporation’s intangible property.  
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When both the IRS and a corporation dispute an intangible property sale, each presents a 
valuation to the Tax Court, who determines based on the regulations, which is the most accurate. 
If neither of the valuations satisfies what the courts deem appropriate, the valuations are 
modified or adjusted accordingly. Valuation is an imperfect process but there needs to be 
guidelines for valuing intangible property.  
Examining the Veritas Software case, both sides had experts valuing this buy-in payment 
and the results were on opposites sides of the spectrum. The court ruled out the IRS valuation 
and determined a few adjustments were needed to correct Veritas’s valuation. But another 
outside expert could have argued another valuation was more accurate.  
In the DHL case, after the court decided the initial payment was not at arm’s length, DHL 
wanted to contest the IRS’s valuation of the trademark. The court reasoned they had no case 
because of the “imprecise art of valuing an intangible asset.”92 
There will never be a formula that can correctly and indisputably value all intangible 
property but guidelines can be set forth to prevent another case like Veritas. One possibility 
would be a collaboration of the firm’s experts and the IRS’ experts prior to trial. The IRS could 
understand how the firm valuated the sale and make changes where they deem appropriate. The 
underlining incentive for corporations to share intangible property is to be able to distribute 
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developmental risk. But valuation regulations are needed to certify that risk is being shared and 
not intangible property value at ridiculously low prices.93  
There is currently another case pending in the United States Tax court relating to buy-in 
payment valuation. In 2008 the IRS sent a notice of deficiency to Medtronic Inc, a Minneapolis 
based medical technology company, for the tax years of 1997,1998, and 1999.94 The notice was 
for a total deficiency in taxes of $53.6 million concerning intellectual property buy-in payments. 
Medtronic disputed the claims and according to their 2010 annual report, a settlement agreement 
is still pending.95 The main issues are transactions and allocations of income between Medtronic 
and their wholly owned subsidiary, Tolochenaz, located in Switzerland. In Medtronic’s initial 
petition to the adjustment, they disagreed calling the claims "arbitrary, capricious and 
unreasonable." Medtronic also claims that the penalties alleged were based on transfer pricing 
regulations passed in 2005.96   
The IRS is expected to issue buy-in payments guidelines under the 1996 regulations.97 
These adjustments should provide an improved plan for future intangible valuations.  
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CHAPTER 9- SOLUTIONS TO THE ARM’S LENGTH STANDARD 
The main purpose of the arm’s length standard is to ensure related party transactions are 
transferred at prices competitive to the open market and to prevent tax evasion.98 In all the cases 
examined, the IRS sent a notice of deficiency due to disagreements over arm’s length pricing.  
Corporations who are issued a notice of deficiency must prove the related party 
transaction comply with the arm’s length standard. Under the various transfer pricing methods, a   
comparable unrelated party transaction is always needed to determine the arm’s length price.99 
The corporations studied have been challenged as to whether the comparable transactions used as 
proof, abide with the arm’s length standard. Each corporation’s unique operations and 
transactions have tested the Tax Court’s interpretation of arm’s length regulations.  
 The comparable transactions element in arm’s length standards is flawed and ambiguous 
because large multinational companies survive on unique related business transactions that have 
no comparables. A determinable arm’s length standard transfer price, when no unrelated 
comparable transaction is present, is impossible.  Because of this imperfection, uncertainty 
surrounds the arm’s length standard.  
In the case studies, the arm’s length standard was the main disagreement in all of the 
court’s decisions. In the Veritas Software case, the IRS questioned if the buy-in payment was in 
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accordance with the arm’s length standard. This led to a horrendous valuation by the IRS experts 
which were deemed unreasonable.100  
The National Semiconductor Corporation case involved determining if the comparable 
transactions used by NSC were at arm’s length. The IRS argued they were not because the 
transactions were different for a variety of reasons. The court ruled they were not, because NSC 
was recording a loss when its subsidiaries were boasting profits.101  
The Compaq case demonstrated that comparable transactions must be identical and yield 
a similar net profit margin in order to be at arm’s length.102  
 In the DHL case, the payment was determined not at arm’s length because DHL’s 
trademark was sold at an undervalued price.103  
The Appeals Court was confused between whether the arm’s length standard should 
apply in all cases or if all costs should be shared in a cost sharing agreement in the Xilinx case. 
The two regulations conflict because two unrelated parties will never share stock option costs but 
the costs pertained to research and development.104   
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With the recent withdrawal of Xilinx’s court decision, this could be an opportune time for 
the IRS and government to reevaluate the arm’s length regulations. If they determine that the 
arm’s length standard is an ineffective enforcement of transfer pricing regulations, then other 
options must be explored.  
Formulary apportionment has been a solution suggested to dethrone the arm’s length 
standard. Currently all United States based multinational corporations are required to declare 
profits in each separate international tax jurisdiction in which a subsidiary is present. With 
formulary apportionment a formula would allocate a firm’s total income by determining the 
percentage of economic activity each subsidiary and parent contributes to the corporation and 
pay taxes accordingly.105 This would decrease incentive to move economic activity and income 
to lower tax jurisdictions because the tax liability of a location is based on the real economic 
activity. This formula would be measured by a percentage of sales, payroll, property and capital 
stock.106 If adopted, multinational corporations could no longer manipulate transfer prices for 
financial benefits.107 It would also be the end to the strategies used by corporations like Google 
and Oracle and the arm’s length standard.  
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For example in NCS’s situation, NCS was selling material and semiconductor dies to its 
Asian subsidiary who packaged and sold the products back to NCS at higher prices. NCS then 
sold their product to customers and recorded a higher profit for the subsidiaries.   
This system being incorporated in the United States is a plausible option but it would take 
international cooperation for it to be successful. If only the U.S. switches to a formulation 
apportionment system and the OECD continues with arm’s length pricing, U.S. corporations 
could face double taxation. However the European Union has considered switching and along 
with the United States, could raise enough support of other countries to make formulation 
apportionment the international standard.108 The difficulty of setting up such a system could also 
pose problems for the involved governments and corporations. The entire business structure of 
these corporations would undergo drastic changes and new accounting standards would have to 
be put in place. Determining the actual formula and formula weights could pose problems as 
well. Implementing such an international system is a daunting task and its reward must be 
compared to its costs.   
CHAPTER 10-CONCLUSION 
Laws and regulations have flaws and are not perfect. But what makes laws and 
regulations powerful is their ability to successfully enforce, regulate and penalize those who 
choose to break them. Most laws have been broken at one point or another and they will continue 
to be broken for as long as this world exists. Transfer pricing regulations are no different. The 
current system has flaws as loopholes are being exploited by corporations for financial benefits.  
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The current transfer pricing system is in no ways perfect but revisions can be made to 
better enforce the laws. With the current debt the United States is facing, corporations legally 
evading $60 billion worth of taxes a year are not helping the cause. The government needs to 
implement a regulation or lower corporate tax rates to deter companies from allocating profits to 
lower tax jurisdictions.  
Valuation of intangible property transactions will never be a perfect science. However, 
regulations of these sales are to ensure intangible property is being shifted for the right reasons. 
The IRS and government need to implement valuation guidelines to confirm the sales between 
related parties are at open market values.   
Along with the valuation of intangible property, the arm’s length standard has been at the 
core of debates concerning current transfer pricing problems. The ambiguity and complexity of 
regulation of the arm’s length standard is the fundamental flaw. There is no arm’s length proof or 
evidence in related party transactions because comparables simply do not exist.  
But will a new system like formulary apportionment solve the transfer pricing woes?  
Probably not. In this world, corporations are always looking for loopholes to gain financial 
advantages over competitors and pay better returns to investors. The United States transfer 
pricing system can only be enforceable if it is reasonable and understood by taxpaying 
corporations and judges. Rather than developing new laws and regulations, the government 
should continue with the arm’s length standard but clarify ambiguities and formulate a better 
plan to enforce regulations.  
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